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1. Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks have delivered
state-of-the-art results on a wide variety of tasks in com-
puter vision, natural language processing and many other
subfields. At the same time, the models driving this suc-
cess have become larger and more complex, requiring ever-
growing computing power to train and run. As a result,
we have seen the rise of Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS)[1], in which models are trained and evaluated by
third parties rather than the end user.
This trend presents significant privacy concerns with re-
gards to both the training data used to build models, as well
as the input data at inference time. Given various levels of
access to a trained model, its parameters, and/or its outputs,
how much information can an adversary recover about its
training data or its inputs?
In this work, we present preliminary results demonstrat-
ing the ability to recover a significant amount of information
about secret model inputs given only very limited access to
model outputs and the ability evaluate the model on additive
perturbations to the input.
2. Background
Significant work has been done on understanding and
mitigating the ability of an adversary to recover training
data given acess to the trained model [4][6]. Less work
has been done on the related problem of recovering infer-
ence inputs given access to some subset of model outputs.
Most similar to our setting is the method presented in [8],
in which model inputs are recovered given access to a trun-
cated set of class logits output by the model.
Homomorphic encryption has been proposed as a way to
allow an untrusted third party to perform inference on sen-
sitive data in a way that limits disclosure of inputs [2]. In
this setting, the model owner receives only the encrypted
inputs, and may also receive only a limited amount of infor-
mation about the network outputs. In this work, we inves-
tigate whether even this limited information is sufficient to
recover sensitive inputs.
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Figure 1. The method for calculating i for a particular noise direc-
tion. The chart shows how class confidences change as  increases.
The point at which the original class is no longer the most probable
defines the value of i.
3. Attack Setting & Notation
We consider the following scenario. A model M is
trained to perform a classification task and made available
to users. In this work we will specifically consider a M to
be a convolutional neural network (CNN), and will present
results from the MNIST[3] classification task as a simple
baseline. A user has a sensitive input, X (we will use x to
represent other non-sensitive inputs), on which they would
like to evaluateM . We will denote byM(X) the identity of
the model’s top-1 prediction for X . Inference is performed
under encryption such that X is kept secret even from the
owner of M . An adversary attempts to recover X given ac-
cess to the following capabilities. The adversary (who may
be the same as the model owner) has black-box access to
evaluate M on their own inputs, and is further capable of
inducing the evaluation of M on additive perturbations of
X , Xˆ = X +N , where N is chosen by the adversary, and
can detect only whether M(X) ?= M(Xˆ). In other words,
the adversary does not know the actual value of the most-
probable class, neither for X nor Xˆ . The goal of the ad-
versary is to recover as much information as possible about
X .
This scenario is inspired by the setting of inference under
homomorphic encryption, in which the additive homomor-
phic property allows the injection of additive perturbations
to the input without exposing the initial value of the input.
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Figure 2. Reconstructions (bottom row) of held-out test data (top
row) from 100-element signatures.
In such a setting, the model’s final output may similarly be
encrypted, but changes in the top class may be exposed by
changes in some down-stream behavior. We note also that
in many settings, an adversary may well have access to the
final output, and we should expect that access to such infor-
mation will further enhance the adversary’s capabilities.
4. Method
Our method works by measuring the sensitivity of the
model to additive perturbations to X in a set of fixed di-
rections, and training a decoder model to predict the pixel-
values of X given these sensitivities. We begin by selecting
a set (in this work we use a set of size 100) of random per-
turbation directions, which we will term N = {Ni}. Each
perturbation direction is a real-valued tensor of the same
shape asX; in the case of MNIST they are of shape 28×28.
For a given input image, x, we compute a set of minimal
i such that M(x + i · Ni) 6= M(x) and i > 0. This set
forms a fingerprint vectorEx = [0, 1,...] which is the input
to our decoder. This process is shown in Figure 1.
To train our decoder, we build a training set of (Ex,x)
pairs. In this work, we will assume for simplicity that the
adversary has access to the same training set as was used
to train M , although this need not be the case. We will use
a variant of the generator architecture from [5], in which
the input vector is projected into a tensor with small spa-
tial extent, which is then upsampled and refined into a full-
resolution image using convolution transpose layers. The
decoder is trained to minimize the L2 error between the
ground truth x and its reconstructions from Ex.
5. Results
Figure 2 shows the results of our method on images from
the MNIST test set. We observe first that the decoder is
clearly able to recover the correct digit class of each im-
age, despite receiving only Ex as input with no information
about class identities. Further, the decoder is able to re-
cover a significant amount of stylistic information such as
digit angle.
Figure 3 shows the results of our method applied to a va-
riety of samples of a single digit type. These results more
clearly demonstrate the ability of our method to recover ad-
ditional information beyond the image class alone. Differ-
ences in orientation, stroke width, and curvature are all ap-
parent in the recovered images.
Figure 3. Reconstructions (bottom row) of a single digit type and
corresponding original digits (top row).
6. Future Work
Although the MNIST dataset is convenient for rapid pro-
totyping, it also may present a significantly easier task than
other, more realistic datasets. On larger datasets, it may
not be possible to perform pixel-level recovery of inputs.
Instead, we hope to recover other, lower-dimensional at-
tributes of the data.
We currently select the perturbation directions uniformly
at random. However, we hypothesize that more cleverly-
chosen perturbations may produce more informative sig-
nals for the decoder. In particular, we intend to explore
directions derived from adversarial attacks[7], as well as
directions obtained by subtracting the centroids of training
classes.
Finally, we are exploring possible defenses to this attack,
either by training models which are robust to this sort of
inversion, or by altering inputs to fool the decoder.
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